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CASE COMMENT
STARE DECISIS: BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE
JUDICIARY'S POWER
Stacey Waldorf
Respondent's application to register a handgun he wished to keep at
home was denied under District of Columbia law.' Subsequently,
Respondent filed an action in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia on Second Amendment grounds to enjoin the city from
enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement, and
the trigger-lock requirement.2 The District Court dismissed the complaint.'
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to
possess firearms, and the city's restrictions violated that right. 4 The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in affirming the appellate court's
decision, HELD that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to possess firearms unconnected to service in the Militia.s
The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Throughout history, the

* For my parents, Ash and Michelle Waldorf. Their continued love, support, and guidance
inspire me to strive for my goals with perseverance and integrity.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008). Under District of
Columbia's statutory scheme, handgun registration is prohibited. Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 72501.01(12), 7-2501.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)). The chief of police has authority to issue
licenses for one-year periods. Id. (citing D.C. Code §§ 22-4504(a), 22-4506 (2001)). Furthermore,
those that lawfully own firearms, other than handguns, are required to keep them dissembled or
bound by a trigger-lock. Id. (citing D.C. Code § 7-2507.02 (2001)). Respondent was a District of
Columbia police officer authorized to carry a gun while on duty. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d. 103, 109 (2004)).
4. Id. (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370,401 (2007)). The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Second Amendment protects an individual's
right to possess firearms. Id.
5. See id. at 2816 (concluding that nothing in Supreme Court precedent prevents such
interpretation as that in the original understanding of the Second Amendment).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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interpretation of the Second Amendment has been disputed.' Some claim
that the Amendment protects the right to possess firearms only in
connection with service in the Militia.' Others assert that it protects an
individual's right to possess firearms, unconnected with service in the
Militia.9
In determining what the law is, the Court has explained that the
doctrine of stare decisis is pertinent to developing the law in a principled
and intelligible manner, thus preventing erratic change.'o Under stare
decisis, principles are founded in the law rather than based on social or
personal influences, thereby contributing to the integrity of the judicial
system." Although the law is not rigid, any past departures from stare
decisis have occurred for articulable reasons. 2 The Court has departed
from staredecisis only when it has felt obligated to "bring its opinions into
agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained.""
In United States v. Miller,4 Respondents were charged under the
National Firearms Act with unlawfully transporting an unregistered
firearm in interstate commerce. Respondents challenged the indictment,
claiming that the Act unconstitutionally violated their Second Amendment
rights." In its interpretation of the Second Amendment, the Court looked
to the debates in the Constitutional Convention, the history and legislation
of the colonies and states, and commentators' writings to ascertain the true
meaning of the Militia. 6 Moreover, the Court looked to state provisions,
protecting a right to keep and bear arms and found that, even though there

7. See generallyHeller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (discussing the inconsistent historical treatment of
the Second Amendment and evincing the general arguments on both sides of the debate in the
majority and dissenting opinions).
8. See id. at 2789.
9. See id.
10. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
11. Id. at 265-66.
12. Id. at 266.
13. Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). The Vasquez Court explained that those advocating a departure have assumed a "heavy
burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate that the values served
by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective." Id.
14. 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939). The firearm at issue in Miller was a double-barrel, twelvegauge Stevens shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length. Id.
15. Id. at 176. The District Court held that the Act violated the Second Amendment, thereby
quashing Respondents' indictment. Id. at 177.
16. See id. at 178-82. The Court determined from this evidence that "the Militia comprised
all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense," and that, "ordinarily
when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves."
Id. at 179.
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were pertinent language variations, none of the provisions materially
supported an individual right unconnected with service in the Militia. 7
The Court held that the Second Amendment's interpretation must
adhere to its "obvious purpose" of ensuring and rendering possible Militia
forces.' Thus, the Court held that the Act at issue did not violate the
Second Amendment because Respondents' possession of the firearm
lacked a reasonable relationship to the preservation of a well-regulated
Militia.19
Recently, the Court readdressed the issue of Second Amendment rights
in Lewis v. UnitedStates.2 0 Petitioner was charged under a convicted felon
statute with knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm.2 1 The Court
addressed whether Petitioner's charge under the statute may be challenged
based on the constitutionality of his prior conviction.2 2 The Court held that
the statute was valid under the rational basis test regardless of whether the
prior conviction was subject to constitutionality issues.2 3 Relying on its
decision in Miller, the Lewis Court explained that the convicted felon
statute restricting the possession of firearms was not based upon
constitutionally suspect criteria and did not infringe on any constitutionally
protected right.24 Thus, Lewis seemed to uphold and verify the Court's
holding in Miller which provides that there is no individual right to possess
a firearm unconnected with service in the Militia.25
In the instant case, the Court rejected Miller and Lewis as precedent in
its interpretation ofthe Second Amendment, reasoning that neither opinion
specifically determined the nature of the Amendment's protected right.26
Instead, the Court presented evidence to demonstrate that the Second

17. See id. at 182. Furthermore, the Court cited important Second Amendment case law
contributing to its analysis and holding. See id.
18. Id. at 178. The Court explained that this "obvious purpose" was the reason for the
creation of the Second Amendment. Id.
19. Id.
20. See 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
21. Id. at 57-58. Petitioner attacked the charge, claiming that his right to counsel had been
violated for the previous conviction, and, therefore, a violation under the convicted felon statute
could not be predicated on that prior, unconstitutional conviction. Id.
22. Id. at 58.
23. Id. at 65-66.
24. Id. at 65 n.8. Specifically, the Court stated that there is no constitutional right to possess
a firearm without a reasonable relationship to the preservation ofa well-regulated Militia. Id. (citing
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
25. See id.
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-16 (2008).
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Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms unconnected
with service in the Militia.2 7
The instant Court began with a textual analysis in which it scrutinized
the wording of the Amendment. 28 First, it found that the operative clause's
text connoted an individual right to possess firearms. 29 Next, the Court
affirmed that the operative clause was consistent with the purpose set out
in the prefatory clause."o The Court then confirmed its interpretation that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms by
analyzing the interpretation ofthe Second Amendment from its ratification
until the end of the nineteenth century." This included looking at state
constitutions preceding and immediately following the ratification of the
Amendment,3 2 the Amendment's interpretation by scholars, courts, and
legislators immediately after its ratification through the late nineteenth
century," and nineteenth-century Second Amendment case law.34
Finally, the instant Court addressed Supreme Court precedent and
determined that none of the Second Amendment cases barred its
27. See id.at 2788-2813 (examining the textual construction of the Second Amendment and
the historical treatment of the Amendment from post-ratification through the late nineteenth
century).
28. See id. at 2789-2804.
29. Id. at 2799. "The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts." Id. at 2789.
The operative clause states, "the right of the people to keep and bear arms." See id.at 2790-91. The
instant Court broke this clause into two phrases, first addressing "the right of the people." See id.
The Court analyzed an unamended Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and founding-era documents
and determined that this phrase referred to an individual right unconnected with service in the
Militia. See id.at 2790-91. Next, the Court addressed "keep and bear arms." See id.at 2791-97. The
Court addressed "keep arms" first and determined that the few examples of founding-era documents
used this phrase in relation to an individual right as well. See id. at 2791-93. Next, the Court
addressed "bear" and found that nine constitutional state provisions used this word in relation to
an individual right. See id. at 2793-94. The Court held that the meaning of this entire phrase
guaranteed an individual right to possess firearms, and that this meaning was strongly confirmed
by the Amendment's historical background. Id. at 2797.
30. Id. at 2800. The prefatory clause announces a purpose. Id. at 2789. It states, "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State. . . ." Id. at 2799. The Court again
broke the prefatory clause into two phrases and analyzed them separately to generate a whole
meaning, as with the operative clause. See id. at 2799-2804.
31. See id. at 2804-12.
32. See id. at 2802-04. Such constitutions included Pennsylvania and Vermont, which the
Court claimed clearly adopted individual rights unconnected with service in the Militia. Id. at 2802.
33. See id.at 2805-07,2809-12. The Court looked to post-ratification commentary, post-Civil
War legislation, and post-Civil War commentary. See id.
34. See id. at 2807-09. The Court determined that these cases "universally support[ed]" an
individual right unconnected with service in the Militia. Id. at 2807. See generally Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (Ga. 1846); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154

(S.W. 1840).
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interpretation that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
possess firearms. Specifically, the Court asserted that Miller was not
binding precedent for two reasons. 6 First, the Court claimed that the
Miller decision addressed only the types of weapons protected under the
Second Amendment and not the nature of the right itself.37 Second, the
instant Court criticized the Miller Court for failing to conduct a thorough
examination of Second Amendment evidence.
Likewise, the instant Court abruptly rejected Lewis as inadequate
precedent.3 ' The Court rested its argument on two factors.4 First, it
determined that there was no Second Amendment issue raised in Lewis,
and second, that the Lewis Court chose to comment on the nature of the
right protected by the Second Amendment in a single footnote.41
In an ardent dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority opinion for
failing to identify new evidence that would justify a departure from
precedent case law.4 2 The dissent insisted that the Miller Court's true
interpretation was that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess
firearms in connection with service in the Militia.4 3 The dissent advocated
that this interpretation was the most natural reading of the text itself and
was the most faithful interpretation in relation to the history of the
Amendment's ratification." The dissent further explained that since the

35. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812-16. See generally Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980);
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
36. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814-16.
37. Id. The Court claimed that its basis for ruling that the Second Amendment did not apply
in Millerwas that the type of weapon at issue was not afforded Second Amendment protection. Id.
at 2814.
38. Id. at 2814-15. The instant Court claimed that it is "particularly wrongheaded" to view
Miller as holding that the Second Amendment provides a right to possess firearms in connection
with service in the Militia, especially considering that the Miller Court did not exhibit extensive
research on the history of the Second Amendment. Id.
39. See id. at 2816 n.25.
40. See id.
41. Id. The constitutional issues were raised under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 57-58 (1980).
42. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent maintained
that the majority's holding was based on a "strained and unpersuasive reading of the Amendment's
text." Id.
43. Id. The dissent explained that most of the evidence presented by the instant Court was
considered in Miller. Id. at 2837. Furthermore, the evidence upon which the instant Court relied
most heavily was available to the Miller Court. Id. at 2845.
44. Id. at 2823. The dissent argued that "[w]hen each word in the text is given full effect, the
Amendment is most naturally read to secure. . . a right to use and possess firearms in conjunction
with service in a well-regulated Militia." Id. at 2831. Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that it is
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Miller decision, hundreds of judges have relied on that interpretation.4 5
The dissent presented an analysis of the Second Amendment similar to that
of the majority's to show that evidence weighed in favor of the Miller
interpretation.' Regardless of whether the evidence was equally
supportive of both interpretations, the dissent would have adhered to a
policy ofjudicial restraint rather than disrupting the settled understanding
of the Second Amendment.4 7
By holding that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to
possess firearms unconnected with the Militia,48 the instant Court has
broadened the scope of its power. The Court has done so by disregarding
its guiding principle of stare decisis, which operates as a judicial
limitation, and by failing to provide newly ascertained evidence to justify
such a departure.4 9
I The instant Court abandoned Second Amendment Supreme Court
precedent without adequate justification.so The Court's argument is weak
because of the two contradicting avenues it took to negate the Miller
holding." First, the Court misinterpreted Millerby narrowly construing the
holding as protection afforded only to certain types of weapons.52 Thus, the
Court claimed that Miller did not engage in any interpretation of the right

unlikely that the Framers would have intended to limit the tools available to courts in regulating
firearms by protecting an individual right. Id at 2847.
45. Id. at 2823. The dissent argued that even if the Second Amendment evidence was evenly
balanced in favor of both interpretations, respect for a settled understanding of the law "would
prevent mostjurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law." Id at 2824. Furthermore,
Justice Stevens noted that "[e]ven if the meaning of the text were genuinely susceptible to more
than one interpretation, the burden would remain on those advocating a departure ... from settled
law to come forward with persuasive new arguments or evidence." Id. at 2831.
46. See generally id. at 2823-46. The dissent reviewed the same Supreme Court Second
Amendment case law, similarly broke apart and analyzed the text of the Amendment, and
confirmed its interpretation with similar legislative history and commentaries. See id.
47. See id. at 2846. The dissent asserted that "judicial restraint would have been far wiser
than the bold decision announced" by the majority. Id. at 2846 n.39. The dissent reasoned that the
majority's holding upset a settled understanding, thereby leaving "future cases [with] the
formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations." Id. at 2846.
48. See id. at 2814-16 (majority opinion).
49. See generally id at 2787-822. The Vasquez Court explained that any departures from
stare decisis in the past have occurred for articulable reasons and because of newly ascertained
evidence. Vasquez v. Hillery, 747 U.S. 254, 266 (1986).
50. See generally Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2787-822. The instant Court failed to present
articulable reasons and newly ascertained evidence in support of its departure. Id.
51. See generally id. at 2813-16.
52. See id. The instant Court held that it only reads Miller to hold that the Second
Amendment does not protect weapons that are "not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes." Id. at 2815-16.
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itself." Nevertheless, the instant Court proceeded to criticize the Miller
Court for its failure to perform adequate research and analysis in
interpreting the Second Amendment." In doing so, the instant Court
thereby negated its prior argument for a narrower holding." Regardless of
the weaknesses or flaws found in the Miller decision," what is most
important to note is that the instant Court failed to sufficiently address the
overwhelming number of courts that have relied on Miller as interpreting
a right to possess firearms only in connection with service in the Militia."
In effect, the instant Court has disrupted a settled understanding of the
Second Amendment and failed to offer any articulable reason for doing
so. 58
Furthermore, the instant Court rejected Lewis for trivial reasoning,
claiming that the Lewis Court's acknowledgment of Second Amendment
protection was inadequate.5 ' The Lewis Court made a conscious effort to
address the nature of the right protected under the Second Amendment.o
This conscious effort by the Supreme Court cannot reasonably be
diminished in weight or value solely because of the way it was presented.
The instant Court has misread and misapplied both of these Supreme Court
decisions.6 ' In doing so, it has unjustifiably departed from stare decisis. 62
As explained in Vasquez, a departure from stare decisis only has
occurred in the past when the Court felt obligated "to bring its opinions
into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained." The
instant Court, however, failed to present any newly ascertained evidence

53. Id. at 2814-16.
54. See id. The Court claimed that Miller did not review many of the same sources and did
not discuss the history of the Second Amendment. Id.
55. See id. at 2813-16.
56. See generally supra text accompanying note 52.
57. See generally Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2823 n.2. The dissent explained that hundreds of
judges have relied on Miller's holding that the Second Amendment protects a right to possess
firearms only in connection with service in the Militia. Id. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See generally id.
59. See id. at 2816 n.25. The instant Court claimed that it was inconceivable that it would rest
its Second Amendment interpretation upon "footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at
issue and was not argued." Id.
60. See generally Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (addressing whether a
legislative restriction on firearms infringed on a constitutionally protected liberty).
61. See generally supra text accompanying note 50-58.
62. See supra text accompanying note 61; see generally infra text accompanying note 63.
63. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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that would provoke such a "dramatic upheaval" of settled law." Moreover,
the instant Court failed to provide any articulable reasons for such a
departure. Instead, it interpreted the Second Amendment in a strained and
unpersuasive manner in an attempt to conclude that the meaning of the
Second Amendment is clear and concise.
For example, the Court manipulated the wording of the two clauses in
the Second Amendment to fit its interpretation.' The dissent performed
this same technique of analysis and verified its interpretation with similar
evidence." Thus, the dissent demonstrated that with some parsing, the
wording in the Second Amendment can validate both interpretations. The
majority failed to acknowledge this and, instead, relied on its findings as
substantial evidence that its interpretation was the true original meaning."
The instant Court's holding - not bound by precedent and without
adequate, newly ascertained evidence - has broadened the scope of
judicial power. The Vasquez Court adamantly asserted that to maintain the
"integrity of our constitutional system of government," the law cannot be
founded upon social or personal influences, and such a departure from
precedent cannot be justified absent articulable reasons and newly
ascertained evidence that would justify the change.6 ' Although the true
motive of the instant Court is unclear, the Court seemed to have
determined its holding prior to its analysis, and then manipulated the
evidence to reach the desired outcome.7 0
The results of the instant Court's interpretation may have initiated a
variety of adverse and unintended consequences. First, it has undermined
the Supreme Court's judicial integrity.7 ' The instant Court's unpersuasive
arguments, lack of candor, and failure to adhere to the guiding principle
ofstare decisis7 may result in a loss of confidence in the Court. Moreover,
the instant Court's lack ofjudicial restraint has now, more than ever, raised
the question of what realistically limits the Court's power.

64. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Much of the evidence presented in the
instant case was available to or reviewed by the Miller Court.Id. at 2837.
65. See generally id. at 2787-822 (majority opinion).
66. See generally supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
67. See supratext accompanying notes 43-45.
68. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816.
69. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
70. See generally Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-816.
71. See generally id. at 2787-822 (explaining that a court undermines its judicial integrity by
departing from stare decisis and failing to give articulable reasons or present newly ascertained
evidence).
72. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788-2816.
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The instant Court's holding has opened the door to a wholly new
interpretation of the Second Amendment" under which courts will likely
have to apply a higher standard of review in defining permissible
regulations. Although gun regulation is of utmost necessity and urgency,
the instant Court's holding has restricted the tools by which a legislature
may properly regulate gun use and possession.7 4 Moreover, such additional
litigation is unwarranted in an already over-burdened court system,
especially without adequately articulable reasoning for departing from
precedent.s
Ultimately, the instant Court has failed to adhere to stare decisis or to
present any adequate, newly ascertained evidence in support of its
departure. In effect, the instant Court has disrupted a settled understanding
of the Second Amendment, undermined the Supreme Court's judicial
integrity, and placed added burdens on the court system. Without any
adequate, newly ascertained evidence and articulable reasoning, the instant
Court should have practiced judicial restraint and followed settled Second
Amendment precedent.

73. Id. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See supra text accompanying note 44.
75. See generallyHeller, 128 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
the majority's ruling will burden the workload of federal judges).
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